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Abstract The standard approach to the so-called paradoxes of identity has been to
argue that these paradoxes do not essentially concern the notion of identity but
rather betray misconceptions on our part regarding other metaphysical notions, like
that of an object or a property. This paper proposes a different approach by pointing
to an ambiguity in the identity predicate and arguing that the concept of identity that
figures in many ordinary identity claims, including those that appear in the para-
doxes, is not the traditional philosophical concept but one that can be defined in
terms of relevant similarity. This approach to the paradoxes will be argued to be
superior to the standard one.
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Any view of identity must eventually come to grips with the so-called paradoxes of
identity, problem cases mostly involving the possibility (or otherwise) of change
over time, such as the Ship of Theseus paradox and the paradoxes of personal
identity, and questions of constitution, such as the well-known puzzle about the
statue and the lump of bronze that makes it up. While what, if anything, these
paradoxes show about identity is controversial, it is not controversial, or at any rate
should not be (see Sect. 1 below), that they show at least the following about
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people’s identity judgments:1 (i) these judgments are context-sensitive in that one
and the same identity statement may be judged true in one conversational setting
and false in another; (ii) they do not always respect the putative transitivity of the
identity relation; (iii) they can be vague or indeterminate; and (iv) intuitions as to
the correctness of a given identity judgment can vary greatly from one person to
another, even among conversation partners who apparently share the same context.
These data are readily seen to put some pressure on the dominant view of identity
according to which identity is ‘‘utterly simple and unproblematic’’ (Lewis 1986,
p. 192).2 For it is evidently incompatible with this view to hold—what the data seem
to suggest—that identity is a context-sensitive and intransitive relation that may
hold vaguely between its relata and that either is subjective or may easily give rise
to subjective interpretation. Surely such a relation could not properly be called
‘‘simple,’’ and whether it could be called ‘‘unproblematic’’ would remain to be seen.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that proponents of the said view have expended
great effort on trying to show that the designation ‘‘paradoxes of identity’’ is really a
misnomer, and that the problem cases that come under this heading do not
essentially concern the notion of identity but rather point to certain misconceptions
we hold of the notion of an object, or that of a property, or both, or some other
metaphysical notion.3
While this approach to the paradoxes is clearly motivated by considerations of
simplicity, it should be noticed that what we are ultimately after is not so much a
simple view of identity per se, but rather a picture of reality that is simple, or more
generally, theoretically satisfying, as a whole. And it is not so clear that the standard
approach to the paradoxes offers the best guarantee of achieving that goal. It must
have struck anyone who has studied the extant solutions to the paradoxes of identity
that there is little unity to them. We get one solution for the Ship of Theseus
paradox, for instance in mereological terms (see, e.g., Krecz 1986); another for the
paradoxes of personal identity, for instance in terms of psychological continuity
(e.g., Parfit 1984); a third for the statue/lump-of-bronze paradox, for instance in
terms of constitution (e.g., Wiggins 1980); and so on, apparently without there being
any trait connecting these solutions. Also, some of these and other attempts to deal
with the paradoxes commit us to conceptions of objects or properties or other
metaphysical categories that are not nearly as simple as the—allegedly misguided—
ordinary conceptions they are meant to supplant.
In this paper, we propose an approach to the paradoxes that we believe to be
more simple overall and, in particular, more unified than the aforementioned one.
Our claim is that the concept of identity that figures in many ordinary identity
statements, including those that appear in the paradoxes, is not the traditional
1 We use ‘‘identity judgment’’ to refer to judgments about the truth value of what we shall call ‘‘identity
statements’’ (or ‘‘identity claims’’), that is, statements of the forms ‘‘a is identical to b,’’ ‘‘a is the same as
b,’’ and related ones.
2 While this is currently the dominant view, it does have its dissenters. For critiques of it, see Geach
(1967, 1972), Deutsch (1998, 2002); Parsons (2000), and Gallois (1990, 2005), among others. Some of
the more popular alternative views of identity include theories of relative identity (Geach, Deutsch), time-
indexed identity (Myro 1986), and vague or indeterminate identity (e.g., Parsons 2000).
3 See, e.g., Jubien (1996, 1997, Chap. 4).
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philosophical concept but a different one, to be understood in terms of relevant
similarity. We will show that this concept of identity can be defined as rigorously,
even if not quite as succinctly, as the traditional philosophical notion of identity. It
will be seen that the resulting account enables us to explain (i)–(iv), and thereby to
handle the paradoxes of identity, in a swift and uniform manner, and that it does so
without requiring any special assumptions about the nature of objects or properties
or whatnot.
To forestall misunderstanding, it merits remark that we do not contest the propriety
of the standard philosophical conception of identity, nor do we deny that the
paradoxes of identity do not essentially concern that conception of identity. Rather,
the claim is that these paradoxes involve what one might call a ‘‘folk notion of
identity’’ and that, if conceived this way, they are no longer genuinely paradoxical.
So, we deny that the correct approach to the paradoxes is to suppose that they betray
some confusion on our part about objects or properties or other metaphysical
categories. The confusion concerns the concept of identity at stake in these paradoxes.
We start, in Sect. 1, by briefly going through some well-known paradoxes of
identity, mainly for purposes of elucidating (i)–(iv). In Sect. 2, we present our
account of the folk notion of identity that we believe to be prevalent in the
paradoxes. And in Sect. 3 we argue that, all things considered, our approach to these
paradoxes compares favorably with the standard one.
1
1.1 Context-sensitivity
Imagine a wife complaining to her husband that he is no longer the same person he
was when they married. She might just be speaking figuratively, of course. But add
some details to the story, for example the husband became an alcohol or drug addict
in the intervening years, or recently underwent a fetal tissue transplant to treat
Parkinson’s disease, and presumably many would, at least pre-reflectively, deem it
possible that she speaks the literal truth.4 Even so, we can all see that it would
probably be no use for the husband to cite these or similar details the next day in
court—where, suppose, he has to stand trial for a crime committed at about the time
of his marriage—to buttress the claim that he is not (identical to) the perpetrator. Or
consider this: for some years now, Emma has been wearing a ring set with many
small rubies. She recently lost one of the stones, but it has already been replaced by
an indistinguishable-looking ruby. Most people will be inclined to say that the ring
on Emma’s finger is the same as the one she has worn over the years,
notwithstanding the one new ruby: small changes to an object are typically judged
to preserve identity. But for Emma the two rings are not identical. The ruby she lost
4 Some would even deem that possible post-reflectively: See White (2007) for the claim that substance
abuse (as well as recovery from it) can alter personal identity, and Northoff (1996) and Hansson (2005)
for a discussion of the claim that fetal tissue transplants affect personal identity. Note that we are not
committing ourselves to the correctness or otherwise of these claims. Here, we are merely registering
facts about people’s identity judgments, whether or not these judgments be correct.
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was originally part of the brooch that her deceased mother wore on her wedding
day; it was that stone that made the ring emotionally valuable to Emma. Does not
Emma’s judgment concerning the nonidentity of the rings appear to be eminently
reasonable? The intuitive answer here seems to be that, indeed, from her
perspective, the rings are not identical. Or consider a statue and the lump of
bronze that makes it up. Are they identical? It seems that, at least initially, most
people are tempted to say yes. But once their attention has been drawn to the
apparently very different modal (including dispositional and counterfactual)
properties the statue and the lump of bronze have, the same people often become
inclined to say the opposite. Cases like these strongly suggest that our preparedness
to judge a given identity statement true is sensitive to the context in which we assert,
or consider asserting, or evaluate, that statement.
1.2 Intransitivity
Few think that replacing just one plank of a ship by a new one yields a different
ship, or that the minute changes we undergo from one day to the next make us a
different person every day; as already intimated, we typically judge that small
changes to an object preserve its identity.5 But a series of small changes may add up
to a big one, and big changes are often not judged to preserve identity. Replacing all
or even just most planks of a ship may prompt the verdict that the resulting ship is
not identical to the original one, and Tom at age 16 may well be judged to be a
different person from Tom at age 60. This suggests that people’s identity judgments
may sometimes fail to respect the putative transitivity of the identity predicate (for
brevity, call such failure ‘‘lack of transitive closure’’). If one thinks the original ship
s0 is identical to the ship s1, where one plank has been replaced, and similarly that s1
is identical to the ship s2, where a second plank has been replaced, and so on, until
all n planks have been replaced, then in order for one’s identity judgments to respect
transitive closure one should judge s0 to be identical to sn—which, assuming n to be
‘‘sufficiently’’ large, not all appear to do.6,7
1.3 Vagueness
At least some people, in at least some contexts, find the intuition compelling that a
ship s0 is nonidentical to the ship sn that results from replacing all n of s0’s planks.
(Proof: The present authors do, for instance when it is assumed that n is large and
that, by means of some fully automated procedure, all of s0’s planks are being
5 Typically—though not unexceptionably, as the just-described case of Emma’s ring exhibits.
6 Or, more carefully, which at least in some contexts not all persons appear to do. Anticipating the
account of identity to be offered below, we may already note that for our judgment concerning the
identity (or otherwise) of the ship, it might for instance matter whether we focus mainly (or exclusively)
on the shape and nature of the material of the planks or whether we also focus on, say, their origin.
7 This is not necessarily to say that people would not want to reconsider their identity judgments when it
is pointed out to them that these judgments lack transitive closure (supposing they do lack it indeed).
Perhaps they would, but that does not alter the fact that sometimes people’s identity judgments do lack
transitive closure.
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replaced within a split second, but still one by one; our intuition is that here, at one
fell swoop, an old ship is being dismantled and a new one is being built on the same
location.) It is logically possible that people who have this intuition will, while one
plank after the other is being replaced, at some stage in the process cease to find the
ship identical to the original ship; they might, for some k (0 \ k \ n), think that
whereas sk is still identical to s0, sk?1 is a different ship. But although this is
logically possible, it is not something one would expect to happen in reality. What
one would expect is that these people will say that whereas s0 is clearly identical to
s1 and perhaps also clearly identical to s2, and whereas it is clearly nonidentical to sn
and perhaps also clearly nonidentical to sn-1, there are indices k such that s0 is
neither clearly identical to sk nor clearly nonidentical to sk; rather, s0 is more or less
identical to sk.
8
To give a different type of example, consider the identity conditions of works of
art. Is a symphony with slight retouches the same work of art as the symphony
without the retouches? Is a French translation of T. S. Eliot’s ‘‘Burnt Norton’’ the
same work of art as the poem in English? Here, too, context may matter. But we
think that in many, perhaps even most, contexts the intuitively best answer to such
questions is neither a yes nor a no, but rather something like sort of. Many other
types of example could be given to illustrate the point that our identity judgments
can be vague.
1.4 Interpersonal variability
Finally, it appears that people’s intuitions about the truth values of identity
statements may vary considerably. That is to say, it is not the case that people
generally agree about what is the intuitively correct thing to say about a given
identity statement, but then (sometimes) disagree about how this intuition is to be
accounted for (or even about whether it has to be done justice to or rather ought to
be explained away); sometimes the disagreement does concern what it is intuitively
correct to say in a given case. Some of these disagreements may simply be further
evidence of the already noted context-sensitivity of our identity judgments. But
even people who can plausibly be regarded to share the same context often arrive at
diverging verdicts about certain identity questions. For instance, anyone having
taught a course in metaphysics will have experienced that some students find it pre-
theoretically manifestly right to say that a statue and the lump of bronze of which it
is made are identical, while others find this pre-theoretically manifestly wrong; or
that some think it obviously true that a cat and this cat minus one of its hairs are
identical while others think it just as obviously false. The phenomenon was in effect
already noted by Plutarch in relation to the Ship of Theseus paradox. As he says,
according to some philosophers the ship remained the same in the process of its
planks’ being gradually replaced, according to others it did not (cf. Rea (ed.) (1997,
p. lii)).
8 See also Smith (2005, 383 f).
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2The above puzzle cases about identity, and related ones, have generally appeared to
be problematic, and even paradoxical, because it has generally been supposed that,
for any objects a and b, there must be exactly one correct answer to the question
whether a and b are identical; that this answer must be objective, determinate, and
independent of the context in which the question is being asked; and that our
answers to such questions must obey the logic of the identity predicate as it is to be
found in the logic textbooks. This is problematic not only because in most of these
cases there does not seem to be a single, intuitively clearly correct answer to the
relevant question that has all the desired properties, but also because, whichever
answer one settles on, one will have to explain why the putatively wrong answer (or
wrong answers, if vagueness is involved) seem(s) at least prima facie to be hardly
less plausible than the putatively correct answer.
But now suppose that what these cases expose is that identity itself is context
sensitive, intransitive, vague, and subjective, or at least that it has some feature that
makes the apparent subjectivity of our identity judgments readily explicable.
Suppose, that is, that in the context in which the wife claims that her husband is no
longer the same person he was at the time of their marriage, she may be speaking
truly, and that yet the same assertion may be false when repeated in the context of
the trial; that when none of us has any special interest in the origin of the rubies in
Emma’s ring, it may be true that the ring with the new ruby is the same as the ring
with the old ruby that later was lost, but that this may be false for Emma for whom
the ruby that was lost was of special emotional significance; that it may be true in
some contexts that the ship s0 is identical to the ship s1, that s1 is identical to s2, and
so on, yet false that s0 is identical to sn—because identity is not, or not in all
contexts, transitive; that it may similarly be true that in some contexts s0 is more or
less identical to sk, for some k—because the identity relation may hold vaguely.
Suppose, finally, that the great interpersonal variability in people’s identity
judgments is due to the fact that there is something subjective to identity, so that a
and b may be identical for one person but not for another, or at least that a and b
may be plausibly held to be identical by the one person and equally plausibly held to
be nonidentical by the other, even if these people share the same context. If
something along these lines is right, then we obviously do not have to choose
between the judgment that the husband is the same person now as he was at the time
of his marriage and the judgment that he is not; nor do we have to choose between
saying that s0 is not identical to s1 and saying that it is; nor do we have to say that s0
is determinately identical (or determinately nonidentical) to sk; nor should we be
surprised by the apparent divergence among people’s identity judgments. What,
then, would remain of the alleged puzzle cases that could be called ‘‘problematic’’
or ‘‘paradoxical’’?
Naturally, to suppose that identity is context-sensitive, intransitive, vague, and
(somehow) subjective, flies in the face of the standard philosophical view of
identity—which is why philosophers have sought to solve the paradoxical cases by
finding fault in our understanding of metaphysical notions other than identity. As
intimated earlier, this approach has failed to yield an even moderately unified
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treatment of the paradoxes. An approach that so far has remained unexplored, but
that we believe to be more promising, is that ‘‘identity,’’ ‘‘identical,’’ ‘‘same,’’ and
kindred words, as they occur in many and perhaps even most ordinary identity
claims and judgments that people make, are not meant to refer to the identity
relation in the philosophers’ sense, but rather to a different one. In fact, that the said
words are ambiguous in ordinary parlance has been previously noted. As Jubien
(1997, 65 ff) convincingly argues, ‘‘identity’’ and related terms are often used to
refer to a relation of relevant similarity. For instance, when the judge asserts that the
man before him in court is identical to the man who committed the crime 20 years
back, he may well mean no more than that the two are sufficiently similar for all
practical concerns to warrant a conviction of the man present in court. But while this
observation is not new, to the best of our knowledge no even remotely worked-out
account of this other, ‘‘relevant similarity’’ or ‘‘folk’’ notion of identity exists in the
literature. Neither do we know of any attempts to relate the observation in a
systematic way to the paradoxes of identity. In the following, we aim to provide a
precise characterization of the said notion of identity and show that it has precisely
the properties the paradoxes of identity at first glance suggest the identity relation to
have. Thus, the hypothesis that it is the folk notion of identity that figures in the
identity claims and judgments that seem to clash in the problem cases would
straightforwardly dissolve their apparent paradoxicality: (i)–(iv) hold because many
of our identity judgments are not really judgments about the identity of things in the
strict, philosophical sense of the word ‘‘identity,’’ but rather about a relation of
relevant similarity (to be made precise) holding between things.
First, however, we should like to make a terminological point. By ‘‘ordinary
identity statements’’ (‘‘ordinary identity claims,’’ ‘‘ordinary identity judgments’’),
we will mean identity statements (respectively, identity claims and judgments) in
which the words ‘‘identical,’’ ‘‘same,’’ and so on, are meant to refer to the folk
notion of identity, and not the philosophers’ notion. But neither this terminology nor
the label ‘‘folk notion of identity’’ should be taken to indicate that we believe all
identity statements in the mouth of ordinary folk to involve the concept of identity
to be defined shortly. Indeed, we do not doubt that, for instance, mathematical
identity statements (such as ‘‘4 ? 7 = 11’’) in the mouth of the folk involve strictly
the philosophical notion of identity. Frankly speaking, we do not know of any litmus
test for distinguishing those uses of the word ‘‘identity’’ (etc.) on which it ought to
be interpreted as designating the standard philosophical concept of identity and
those on which it rather ought to be interpreted as designating the folk concept. We
believe that the latter is likely to be more often than not, perhaps even
predominantly, the referent of ordinary, nonphilosophical uses of ‘‘identity,’’ but
what we want to argue for, and all that matters for our present purposes, is merely
that it is the referent of that word as it occurs in the identity claims and judgments
that figure in the kind of puzzle cases that were surveyed in the previous section.
Our proposal, then, is that an ordinary identity statement to the effect that some
object a is identical to some object b is true iff a and b are highly similar in all
relevant respects, where ‘‘highly’’ and ‘‘relevant’’ are both to be thought of as being
context-dependent terms. That is to say, on our proposal, an ordinary identity
statement ‘‘a is identical to b,’’ made or evaluated in a conversational context C, is
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to be understood as a claim to the effect that a is identicalC to b—or IdC(a,b), for
short—which in turn is taken to mean that a is highlyC similar to b in all relevantC
respects. Another way to put this would be: IdC(a,b) iff for every relevantC respect r,
any difference in r between a and b is, if it exists at all, negligibleC, where again, as
the notation indicates, it is assumed that a difference that is negligible in one context
need not be so in another.
To be already a bit more specific about the allegedly context-sensitive terms, note
that in principle there are indefinitely many respects in which any two objects might
be found to be similar (in some degree) to one another. But psychological research
concerning people’s similarity judgments warrants the claim that, in comparing
objects, we never take into account all of these respects. Various studies show
similarity judgments to vary systematically with context. It has, for instance, been
demonstrated that when research participants are asked whether one object is similar
to another, or whether it is more similar to it than to a third object, their answers are
predictably influenceable by varying certain parameters of the experimental context.
Cognitive psychologists consider as the best explanation for this apparent context-
sensitivity that, first, in comparing objects people selectively attend to some proper
subset of the possible respects in which the objects might be compared, and second,
that it is subject to contextual variation which subset of respects people focus on.9
The respects attended to in context C are what we call ‘‘the relevantC respects.’’
10
The assumption of the context-sensitivity of what counts as highly similar in a
given respect is more speculative. Though the literature cited in note 9 reports many
experiments in which test subjects were asked to rank objects according to their
similarity, we have not found any experiments in which test subjects were explicitly
asked whether certain objects are highly similar in a given respect. And the fact that
researchers found the answers to the first type of question to be context-sensitive
does not by itself warrant the assumption that the standards for what counts as
highly similar in a given respect are context-sensitive. But while we ourselves do
find the assumption of the context-sensitivity of being highly similar at least
plausible in light of the reported research, we wish to emphasize that it is
dispensable for our purposes: we could explain everything we want to explain even
9 The context-sensitivity of people’s similarity judgments has been reported in, among others, Tversky
(1977); Barsalou (1982); Murphy and Medin (1985); Nosofsky (1986); Medin and Shoben (1988); Medin
et al. (1993, and several of the papers collected in Hahn and Ramscar (eds.) (2001b); see also Fairchild
(1998, 168 f) for a striking example of how a change in background information can affect similarity
judgments. Nosofsky (1986) gives ample empirical evidence both for the claim that selective attention
influences similarity judgments and for the claim that selective attention is context-dependent. Also on an
experimental basis, Smith and Heise (1992, p. 242) conclude that ‘‘perceived similarity is the result of
psychological processes and it is highly variable. The central process that changes perceptual similarity is
attention. The perceived similarity of two objects changes with changes in selective attention to specific
perceptual properties.’’ In the same vein, Medin et al. (1993, p. 272) conclude that ‘‘[t]he respects
associated with similarity assessments are influenced by the comparison context.’’ Incidentally, the thesis
that in comparing objects people selectively attend to certain features was already argued for, on grounds
other than the context-sensitivity of similarity judgments, in Fisher and Zeaman (1973).
10 They are thus to be distinguished from respects that, in a given context, one might assert to be relevant
to a certain purpose, as for instance when two candidates for a job are said to be alike in all relevant
respects. Respects explicitly asserted to be relevant in that sense will not generally be all the respects
attended to in the context of the assertion.
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if we assumed that what counts as highly similar in a given respect is, for any
context and any conceivable respect, fixed. So, instead of pushing our intuition
about the assumption here, we invite those who do not share this intuition to read the
shortly to be introduced notion of a similarity threshold for a given respect as being
context-invariant and not—as we shall do—as being context-sensitive.
We expect that some will still be uncomfortable with the seeming vagueness of
the phrase ‘‘being highlyC similar in all relevantC respects,’’ and concomitantly with
the proposed folk notion of identity. As will now be shown, however, the designated
phrase can be given a formally precise explication in scientifically uncontentious
terms.
The basic idea for making the above definition precise is to identify each context
C with a set SC of metric similarity spaces, where SC contains a separate space for
each respect relevant in C (because of this one-to-one correspondence between
spaces and respects, we shall use ‘‘r’’ as a variable for both). For present concerns,
think of such spaces as one-dimensional or multidimensional structures with a
distance function (a metric) defined on them.11 Objects determine points in these
spaces. As the name ‘‘similarity space’’ suggests, distances between points are
supposed to indicate degrees of similarity: the smaller the distance between the
representations of two objects in a given space, the more similar the objects are in
the corresponding respect. Perhaps, the simplest example of such a space is a three-
dimensional Euclidian space with a Euclidian metric serving to represent proximity
in ordinary visual space. Other much-discussed examples of metric similarity spaces
include (one-dimensional) temporal space, auditory space (which is typically taken
to be two-dimensional), color space (which is typically taken to be three-
dimensional), olfactory and tactile spaces, and spaces corresponding to various
physical parameters, such as density and hardness. Modal notions (including
dispositional and counterfactual ones), such as solubility and fragility, can also be
modelled by means of metric similarity spaces. Among the more complex examples
are multidimensional shape spaces and action spaces, such as are discussed in
Ga¨rdenfors (2000, pp. 94–98, 2007), respectively.12 As a matter of fact, given the
flexibility of this approach—one can go to any number of dimensions, and define
any metric one likes—it seems safe to assume that, for any respect in which two
11 See Ga¨rdenfors (2000, Chap. 1) for precise definitions.
12 Because we have become so accustomed to analyzing modal notions in terms of possible worlds, the
obvious similarity spaces appropriate for such notions might seem to be some sort of metricized possible
world spaces, in the manner of Lewis (1973, 50 ff). But there are other, perhaps simpler, approaches. For
example, with each object we could associate not only a point in shape space corresponding to its actual
shape, but also a set of points representing what we might regard as its possible shapes. The measure of
this set might be taken to indicate the ‘‘transformability’’ of the object, which could be represented on a
simple line with two endpoints, one standing for maximal, the other for minimal transformability (and
intermediate points standing for intermediate degrees of transformability; various obvious metrics can be
defined for this space). To illustrate, we may suppose that, in this space, a statue would be represented as
very close to the minimal endpoint (a lowering by one tenth of a millimeter of the torch of the Statue of
Liberty might be assumed to result in a shape that is still among the possible shapes associated with the
statue); the lump of bronze of which it is made, on the other hand, would, we may suppose, be represented
as close to, or even at, the other extreme.
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objects might ever be sensibly found to be similar by anyone, there exists a
corresponding metric similarity space.
The idea, as intimated, is that for each respect that is relevant in a context, the
context contains a corresponding similarity space.13 If color is a relevant respect in
C, then SC will contain a color space; if shape is relevant, SC will include a shape
space; if time is relevant, it will include a temporal space; and so on. For each
similarity space r 2 SC; let dr(,) be the distance function associated with that
space; so dr(a,b) measures the distance between the representations of objects a and
b in r. Also associated with each r 2 SC is a threshold value trC> 0; which may be
different for different r and also—though for reasons given above this may be taken
as optional—different for the same r in different contexts C. With this at hand, we
can state a precise definition of folk identity:
IdCða; bÞ () 8r 2 SC: drða; bÞ6 trC: ð1Þ
Variants of this definition are not hard to conceive. For example, we might stipulate
that two objects are identicalC iff the sum of the distances between their various
representations in the similarity spaces corresponding to the respects that are
relevant in C does not exceed a certain threshold value, which depends on the
context; or we might consider taking a weighted average of those distances,
supposing that all relevant respects need not bear equally heavily on our identity
judgments in a context.14 However this may be, here we will not attempt to decide
which of these definitions or still further variants is the correct one (supposing our
basic idea is correct, so that at least some definition along the above lines
characterizes the word ‘‘identity’’ as it occurs in ordinary identity statements). Nor
need we, for it is reasonable to think that, given any plausible such specification of
the phrase ‘‘being highlyC similar in all relevantC respects,’’ our account is able to
explain in a swift and seemingly natural way the data about our ordinary identity
judgments elucidated in Sect. 1.
To appreciate this, consider that given such an account, the folk notion of identity
is contextual by definition; it is obvious, then, that our ordinary identity judgments
are context-sensitive. What causes the occasional lack of transitive closure of these
identity judgments should be equally obvious. That a and b differ at most
negligiblyC in any relevantC respect and that b and c do so as well does not
guarantee that a and c differ at most negligiblyC in all relevantC respects;
negligibleC differences may add up to nonnegligibleC ones. Furthermore, it is
natural to suppose that there is, or at least may be, some vagueness in what counts as
being highly similar in a given respect and context; that is, assuming (1) once more,
13 From a mathematical point of view, it would be possible to combine the various similarity spaces in
one unique similarity space, viz., the product space of the similarity spaces related to the relevant
respects. However, our proposal is inspired by the way psychologists look at similarity; see, e.g., Hahn
and Ramscar (2001a, p. 260): ‘‘[M]ost interesting uses of similarity in psychology involve the assessment
of similarity in multiple respects. For instance, comparing two objects in terms of overall similarity will
be a composite of their similarity with respect to colour, texture, size, shape, etc. This negates the
reduction of similarity to a single ‘respect’ …’’
14 As might be realistic; see, e.g., Nosofsky (1986), especially Eq. 6 (or Eq. 2 of Shin and Nosofsky
(1992)).
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what the threshold value tC
r is may not be precisely fixed for every or even any
respect r in every or even any context C.15 Finally, if our theory is correct, then the
context-sensitivity of folk identity would certainly partially explain the interpersonal
variability that is exhibited by people’s identity judgments: people may come to
different judgments as to the identity of two things because they are judging in
different contexts. As we noted, however, the data suggest that even people who share
the same context may sometimes disagree about the truth values of certain identity
claims; that sort of interpersonal variability cannot be explained in terms of context-
sensitivity. In our view, the best explanation of these cases involves the fact that there
is often some interpersonal variability in the interpretation of vague terms, so that there
may be some interpersonal variability in the interpretation of ‘‘highlyC,’’ which, as
remarked a moment ago, is plausibly thought of as being somewhat vague.
A number of further comments on the theory are in order. First, it cannot be
stressed enough that by relying on the notion of a metric similarity space we are not
availing ourselves of anything outlandish: Metric similarity spaces nowadays
belong to the standard equipment of cognitive scientists and other researchers
studying human cognition.16 Moreover, if someone were to conceive of different
means for quantitatively representing similarity, then they might serve our purposes
just as well.
Second, there is not the slightest linguistic evidence to suggest that the folk’s
identity judgments do not always respect the putative reflexivity and symmetry of
the identity predicate. So presumably we should not regard as admissible
explications of the phrase ‘‘being highlyC similar in all relevantC respects’’ that
do not render folk identity reflexive and symmetric. In any event, it is clear that,
assuming (1) or the suggested variants thereof, we do have, for all a, b, and C, both
IdC(a, a) and IdC(a, b) iff IdC(b,a). The former holds in virtue of the fact that, by the
definition of a metric, dr(a,a) = 0 for all r, the latter in virtue of the fact that, again
by the definition of a metric, dr(a,b) = dr(b,a).
17
Third, on our theory, a shift in context, say from C to C0 , can be brought about in
more than one way. It can be effected by the becoming relevant of a presently
irrelevant respect or, conversely, the becoming irrelevant of a presently relevant
15 With respect to the threshold of discrimination between colors, which may well be thought of as being
the threshold, in the sense of our definition, for the respect color, Hardin (1988, p. 175) notes that ‘‘the
‘classical’ conception of the fixed, sharp threshold… must be abandoned, and has in fact been abandoned
in psychophysics for many years.’’ See in the same vein Wyszecki and Stiles (2000, 323 ff). To make this
technically precise, tC
r could be thought of as an interval rather than as a number. Another option would be
to assume fuzzy set theory and allow expressions of the form ‘‘drða; bÞ 2 ½0; trC ’’ to hold to any degree in
the interval [0,1] (with degree 1 corresponding to classical membership and degree 0 to classical non-
membership). Following Williamson (1994), we could also make the vagueness a matter of our ignorance
of the exact value of the threshold, where this is always sharp. We want to remain neutral regarding these
options, as well as regarding how to best interpret the expression ‘‘dr(a,b) O tC
r ’’ in (1) depending on
which option is chosen for modelling vagueness. (Thanks to the anonymous referee here.)
16 See, among many others, Churchland (1989, 2007), Clark (1993), Ga¨rdenfors (2000), Shepard (2001),
and Feldman and Tremoulet (2006). For critical discussion of the similarity space approach, see Fodor
and Lepore (2002, Chaps. 8 and 9).
17 As the metrics (1) assumes are supposed to measure similarity, their symmetry might seem to conflict
with experimental findings in psychology to the effect that people’s similarity judgments can be
asymmetric. For reasons given in Ga¨rdenfors (2000, 112 ff), the conflict is apparent only.
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one; formally, this would correspond to the addition, respectively the removal, of a
similarity space to (from) SC, resulting in SC0. But it can also be effected by a
tightening or loosening of some standards for sufficient similarity in already
relevant respects, in which case the shift will formally consist in a raising or
lowering of the threshold values associated with the similarity spaces corresponding
to the respects. Of course, it is possible for both of these mechanisms to be in play at
once. If, as was briefly suggested, we attach weights to the respects relevant in a
context, then a shift in context might also consist in or involve a shift in those
weights. It must be admitted that the foregoing only describes the relatively crude
mechanisms behind context-shifting. The finer mechanisms, in particular those
having to do with how things we assert or suggest determine and change
conversational contexts, have recently been given some attention in epistemology
and the philosophy of language, areas in which contextual tactics have become
popular.18 But it is generally agreed upon by philosophers who are interested in
contextualist issues that still more work in this direction needs to be done.
Fourth, it may be good to note what our theory is not.While folk identity is
‘‘relativized,’’ our theory should be hard to confuse with Geach’s so-called relative
identity theory: The latter theory relativizes identity not to contexts but to sortal
concepts, in the sense that things that are the same K1 can be distinct K2’s (with K1
and K2 designating sortal concepts).
19 It should be equally hard to mistake our
theory of folk identity for a theory of qualitative identity. There being a great
number of relevantC respects in which objects a and b differ non-negligiblyC is
compatible, as far as our theory goes, with rightly judging a and b to be qualitatively
identical.20
Fifth, it is worth pointing out that (1) entails a contextual version of Leibniz’s
Law. Within the similarity space approach, properties are representable as regions in
the domain of a similarity space; for instance, the property blue corresponds to a
certain region in color space.21 Let P , r mean that P is a property representable as
a region in similarity space r, and, for any object a and property P , r, define
18 This is especially true of epistemology, where they are among the most hotly debated topics. For some
influential defenses of epistemological contextualism, see Cohen (1988, 1999), DeRose (1992), and
Lewis (1996); for an early general attempt to chart the finer mechanisms behind context-shifting, see
Lewis (1979).
19 See Geach (1967, 1972); see also Deutsch (1998, 2002).
20 How exactly the folk notion of identity relates to qualitative identity depends on how one defines the
latter notion. The referee suggested to define two objects being qualitatively identical as their having zero
distance in every similarity space that corresponds to an intrinsic or qualitative respect (whether or not
relevant). But it might be plausible to think of qualitative identity as being a context-sensitive notion, too,
in which case it would seem better to contextualize the foregoing definition by requiring only zero
distance in every similarity space that corresponds to a relevant qualitative respect. Alternatively, or in
addition, one might want to relax the definition by requiring a distance below a certain positive threshold
value instead of zero distance. Given both the referee’s definition and the contextualized version thereof,
we could have that IdC(a,b) for some a, b, and C without a and b being qualitatively identical (or being
qualitatively identical in C). Whether we could have this if the zero distance requirement is abandoned
would depend on how the threshold values for qualitative identity are related to those for folk identity.
21 See Ga¨rdenfors (2000, Chap. 3) for a detailed account of the representation of properties in similarity
spaces.
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Dr(a,P) as the smallest distance between the representation of a in r and points in
the region corresponding to P in r; that is, more formally,
Drða; PÞ :¼ infb2P drða; bÞ:
Furthermore, let the predicate P() denote property P. Then from (1) we obtain:22
8a; b IdCða; bÞ ! 8r 2 SC8P  r PðaÞ ! Drðb; PÞ6 trC
  
: ð2Þ
The proof is straightforward: Assume the antecedent. Further assume that P(a)
holds, where P , r for some r 2 SC: By (1) it holds that drða; bÞ6 trC; and hence, by
the symmetry of the metric, drðb; aÞ6 trC . Because, first, P (a) holds and so a lies in
region P, and thus second, by the definition of Dr(,) we have Dr (b,P) O dr (b,a), it
must be that Dr(b,P) O tC
r .
To see how close (2) is to the original version of Leibniz’s Law, first observe that
if IdC(a,b), and P(a) holds for some P  r 2 SC; then it may be that Dr(b,P) = 0,
which means that b lies in region P, in which case both a and b have property P; but
if Dr(b,P) [ 0, then we will still have that b lies, while outside the region P, within
a—in context C—negligible distance from it.23 That is to say, although the identity
of things in the above-defined sense does not entail the sharing of all properties, it
does entail the near sharing, or better still, the so near as to make no odds sharing,
of all relevant properties (as we may think of the properties that are representable in
any of the similarity spaces corresponding to the relevant respects). As we might
also say, within a negligible margin of error, two objects that are identical in the
folk’s sense have all contextually relevant properties in common. A thus
contextualized version of Leibniz’s Law deviates from the original one only in
ways that, given a context, are negligible: In each context, the restricted version at
most neglects differences that are small enough to be negligible indeed in that
context; and compared to the original version, the restricted version at most fails to
quantify over properties which, in the given context, count as irrelevant.
22 It may be noted that the consequent of (2) could also be taken to define folk identity. Would that yield
a definition equivalent to (1)? No. To see this, let r be a one-dimensional similarity space consisting of the
interval [0,1] with the Euclidian metric dr (a,b): = |a-b| defined on it. Let the properties representable in
this space be P1 = [0,.5], P2 = [.1,.3], P3 = [.12,.4], and P4 = [.6,1], and let a = .11 and b = .31.
Furthermore let r be relevant in C, and let tC
r = .02. Now P1(a) and P1(b) both hold; P2(a) holds and
Dr(b,P2) \ tC
r ; P3(b) holds and Dr(a,P3) \ tC
r ; and neither P4(a) nor P4(b) holds (predicate Pi() denotes
property Pi, for i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4gÞ: Supposing, without loss of generality, that r is the only respect relevant
in C, we would have that a and b are identicalC if the consequent of (2) were taken to define folk identity.
However, because dr(a,b) = .31 - .11 = .2 [ tC
r , according to definition (1) it is not true that a and b are
identicalC. (Here it is important to observe that if P is a property representable in r, then the complement
of P with respect to r is not necessarily also a property representable in r, or representable in any other
similarity space, for that matter. As Ga¨rdenfors (2000, 66 ff) explains, it would be wrong to think that any
region of a similarity space corresponds to a property; only regions that satisfy certain conditions do. And
the class of regions satisfying these conditions is not closed under, for instance, the operation of taking the
set-theoretic complement in a space.)
23 To be mathematically precise, we should remark that if Dr(b,P) = 0, the point b could also be a limit
point not lying within P; for example, if property P is characterized by the open interval ]0,1[ in a one-
dimensional similarity space and b = 0, then Dr(b,P) = 0 although b 62 P: Clearly, though, in that case it
still holds true that b lies within a negligible distance from P.
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Some might wonder whether (2) does not fall prey to the critique Koslicki (2005)
has mounted against restricted versions of Leibniz’s Law proposed in defense of
other conceptions of identity, such as the restrictions to be found in Gibbard (1975),
Deutsch (1998), and Parsons (2000). According to Koslicki, some of these
restrictions are flawed in that they simply stipulate which properties Leibniz’s Law
is to be restricted to, and all of them are flawed in that they are overly restrictive,
excluding properties that it would be harmless to include and that one also
intuitively would expect identical objects to share. For instance, she argues that, by
excluding de re modal properties in general, Gibbard is not just excluding properties
like being essentially a statue, which are troublesome for his view of contingent
identity, but also properties like being fragile, which one would expect a statue and
the lump of bronze of which it is made to share (or jointly fail to have). Also, the
proposal lacks any independent motivation, Koslicki thinks, and is thus both ad hoc
and overly restrictive.
But (2) is neither ad hoc nor overly restrictive, we claim. It is not ad hoc because,
as we saw, the restriction follows directly from (1), which in turn we take to be
supported by the fact that it yields a simple and unified explanation of the data listed
under (i)–(iv) and thereby a simple and unified solution to the paradoxes of identity.
Nor is it overly restrictive, given that in each context it excludes precisely those
properties that are found irrelevant anyway in that context. In fact, it would seem
hard to press the charge of being overly restrictive against it, as it does not exclude
any property in any absolute sense. For instance, it is not that, when we are in a
context in which the folk judge a statue to be identical to the lump of bronze of
which it is made, they are somehow absolutely excluding the property being
transformable.24 It is just that, taking into consideration this property, and thereby
making it relevant, effects a change in context that may be expected to alter the
folk’s judgment that the statue and the lump of bronze are identical.
As a final comment, we should like to stress that, contrary to what some of the
above phrasings might suggest, our theory is not confined to ordinary identity
statements relating material objects but applies to any such statement as long as the
things it relates can be represented by points in a similarity space. For instance, it
seems unproblematic to think of the theory as delivering the truth conditions for
ordinary identity statements concerning color shades, which are not commonly
regarded as material objects: Color shades are easily located in three-dimensional
color space, and various metrics exist for that. It is possible to extend the scope of
the theory still further. As intimated, the similarity space approach allows us to
think of properties as regions in a similarity space. So, to apply the theory to identity
statements concerning colors as categories—to mention but one example—we
would only need to define a metric on color space that enables us to measure
distances between regions in that space, which can easily be done. In fact, an
existing metric that would do the job is the so-called Hausdorff distance.
For properties P , r and Q , r, this metric defines the distance between them,
hr(P, Q), as follows:
24 This property may be thought of as a segment (the ‘‘upper’’ segment) of the similarity space described
in note 12.
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hrðP; QÞ :¼ maxfsupx2P Drðx; QÞ; supx2Q Drðx; PÞg;
where Dr(,) is as defined above.
3
We saw that our theory of folk identity furnishes a simple explanation of why
ordinary identity statements have the various characteristics the paradoxes of
identity exhibit them to have: These characteristics all flow directly from the
meaning of the words ‘‘identity,’’ ‘‘identical,’’ and so on, as they occur in ordinary
identity statements. For example, on this theory there is nothing unsettling about the
fact that both the wife may seem to be right that her husband is no longer the same
person he was at the time of their marriage and the judge may seem to be right that
the husband still is the same person he was at that time: Within their respective
contexts, and on a folk understanding of ‘‘same,’’ both the wife and the judge may
be right. Similarly, people may find the original ship s0 to be identical to the ship s1
where one plank has been replaced, s1 to be identical to s2 where two planks have
been replaced, and so on, and yet not find s0 identical to sn, because, on a folk
understanding of ‘‘identical,’’ it may be that s0 is identical to s1, s1 to s2, and so on,
and yet s0 not identical to sn; this is consistent to suppose, because folk identity is
not, or need not be in all contexts, a transitive relation. It will be clear from the
previous section that answers to the other questions concerning ‘‘identity’’ (and
related words) that have appeared puzzling follow equally straightforwardly from
our account.
That we are thereby able to solve, or rather dissolve, the paradoxes of identity is
by itself no advantage of our approach to these paradoxes over the orthodoxy, which
prefers to stick to a traditional philosophical interpretation of the identity predicate.
After all, this orthodoxy, too, has produced solutions to the paradoxes, as consulting
almost any modern metaphysics textbook will tell, and it is not our intention here to
argue that none of these solutions really ‘‘work.’’ Yet we do think that our approach
does a better job in handling the paradoxes than the rival approach does.
First, our approach affords a highly unified treatment of the paradoxes. The
hypothesis that the identity statements giving rise to the paradoxes are ordinary
identity statements, and thus that the words ‘‘identity,’’ ‘‘identical,’’ ‘‘same,’’ and so
on, as they occur in these statements, are to be understood along the lines of (1),
entails that, in fact, the paradoxes are not paradoxes at all. By contrast, as intimated
at the outset, there is apparently no trait connecting the solutions that have come out
of the orthodox approach to the paradoxes.
Second, solutions to the paradoxes follow directly from our proposal in that they
do not require any additional metaphysical assumptions. This is an important
advantage of our approach over the standard one, especially since virtually all
solutions to the paradoxes of identity that the latter has delivered seem to commit
one to holding things that fly in the face of common sense, be it that only the present
time is real, and past and future times are unreal, be it that what we commonly think
of as nonrelational properties are really relational ones, be it that objects are not
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really the things we have taken them all our lives to be, be it some other prima facie
untoward assumption.
Third, our account does not require us to assume that people are often mistaken in
making identity claims of the sort that occur in the paradoxes, in contrast to the rival
approach, on which it is for instance typically held that people are wrong when they
say that the lump and the statue are identical (or, if according to the author’s view
the other verdict is correct in this case, that they are wrong when they say that the
two are not identical). It should be uncontroversial that if we can solve, or dissolve,
the paradoxes of identity without having to attribute massively erroneous judgments
to people, then, all else being equal, we should do so.
It might be said that, on the negative side, we are postulating an extra sense of
‘‘identity’’ and related words, and that thereby our proposal violates a linguistic
version of Occam’s razor, according to which senses are not to be multiplied
without necessity. But this objection would misfire. For we are clearly not
postulating a new sense of ‘‘identity.’’ As we said, it had been observed before that
there is an ambiguity in the use of the word ‘‘identity.’’ Our sole aim here has been
to be as precise about one of the meanings of this word as philosophers have always
tried to be about the other meaning—what Jubien (1997, 65 f) calls the ‘‘just-one-
thing meaning’’—of the word, and then to relate the thus specified notion to the
paradoxes of identity. Put differently, it is not as though we have invented a new
meaning for the identity predicate; we have explicated an already familiar, though
by philosophers somewhat neglected, meaning and shown how elegantly the
hypothesis that this meaning is at play in the so-called paradoxes of identity allows
us to handle these paradoxes.25
In short, we believe our approach to the paradoxes of identity to do better than
the standard one on at least three counts: It affords a unitary treatment of these
paradoxes; solutions to the paradoxes flow immediately from definition (1) in that
they do not require the adoption of extra metaphysical assumptions; and our
approach does not require that we assume people’s identity statements to be often
mistaken.
To make the above rather abstract considerations a bit more concrete, and
thereby to bring further into relief the merits of our approach, we want to look in
some detail at a specific paradox and compare how it is handled on our approach
with how the paradox has been dealt with by proponents of the rival approach.
Consider, once again, the statue/lump of bronze problem. While the solutions to this
problem that can be found in the literature differ in their details, they virtually all
entail, as already intimated, that the statue and the lump of bronze fail to be
identical. Lowe (2002, p. 72), who advocates a solution of this type, acknowledges
that it has the odd consequence that different material objects may spatially
coincide. He thinks this oddness can be explained away to some extent, or at any
rate assuaged somewhat, by arguing that we may find the thought of differing but
coinciding material objects odd because we easily confuse it with the claim that two
25 As the referee noted, if qualitative identity is defined in the way s/he suggests (cf. note 0), then folk
identity could be thought of as a generalization of qualitative identity, which would buttress our claim that
are we not inventing a new notion of identity.
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material objects of exactly the same kind—for instance two statues, or two lumps of
bronze—can coincide. Clearly, in the present case the objects are not of the same
kind. This explanation is anything but satisfactory, however. For consider that we
find it just as odd to think that two material objects of very different kinds—like a
dog and a violin, for instance—can coincide, as that two statues can coincide.
We indicated that on a folk understanding of the identity predicate there may be
contexts as well in which it is true that the statue and the lump of bronze are not
identical to one another. In those same contexts, it will also be true to say that
different material objects—material objects that are not in all contextually relevant
respects highly similar to one another—can spatially coincide. Unlike Lowe,
however, we have a perfectly good explanation available for why this consequence
seems odd. The explanation starts by noting that in ordinary, nonphilosophical
contexts we are typically not attending to any modal respects in which a statue and
the lump of matter that makes it up may differ. For instance, typically when we look
at a bronze statue, we do not wonder about the things that might destroy it yet not
destroy the lump of bronze. This fuels our intuition that we are looking at just one
object, and not two different yet coinciding ones. Generalizing over other objects we
have encountered in similarly mundane contexts, we come to have the intuition that
different material objects never coincide. Yet when our attention is drawn to the fact
that, along various modal dimensions, the statue and the lump of bronze do differ
from one another, we become inclined to accept that they are distinct objects after
all. But that inclination does not all of a sudden annihilate our deeply rooted
intuition that no two different material things ever coincide.
Our solution seems to have another advantage over the kind embraced by Lowe
and others. These philosophers tend to invoke the notion of constitution to account
for the relationship between different yet spatially coinciding objects. This notion
provides their answer to the question ‘‘[I]f that relationship is not one of identity,
what then is it?’’ (Lowe 2002, p. 73). While, as we saw, on our view it may hold in
some contexts that material objects that fail to be highly similar in some
contextually relevant respect can spatially coincide, we do not have to invoke an
extra concept to explain the relationship between such coinciding objects. Even in a
context C in which we consider modal dimensions of evaluation, and thus rule that
the statue and the lump of bronze are nonidentical, it will typically be true that the
objects are highlyC similar in most relevantC respects. Thus, on the proposed folk
interpretation of ‘‘identical,’’ it would make sense in that context to say that the
objects, though distinct, are close to being identical. It is hard to see what further
illumination is to be gained by introducing the concept of constitution for the
purpose of describing the relationship between the objects, if the folk account of
identity already endows us with a notion—that of near-identity—that can do the
requisite explanatory work.
In closing, we should like to address a question that may be raised by the
foregoing. The question is as follows: If there is really this contextual folk notion of
identity at play in the paradoxes of identity, then how come this has not been clear
from the start? Differently put, why at all have philosophers taken these paradoxes
to be paradoxes of identity, if they do not involve the traditional philosophical (just-
one-thing) concept of identity?
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First note that, for better or for worse, in metaphysics no less than in other areas
of philosophy, we tend to appeal to linguistic intuitions to support or criticize
particular positions, where by ‘‘linguistic intuitions’’ we mean something like
judgments that we would pre-reflectively, or clearer still, pre-philosophically, make.
This is true with a vengeance for the part of metaphysics concerned with the
paradoxes of identity, which come in the form of homely stories together with a
typically explicit appeal to ‘‘what we would ordinarily say.’’ So, in discussing these
paradoxes, we qua philosophers give pride of place to intuitions about which
identity statements we qua ordinary people would find it reasonable to make and
which not. That is to say, while intending to discuss the philosophical notion of
identity, we heavily draw on intuitions about statements that involve a different
concept of identity, or so we have been urging.
A second thing to notice is that the ambiguity of the identity predicate that we
and others have pointed at is not of the customary type that we find in, for instance,
‘‘bank’’ (financial institution vs. ridge) or ‘‘cape’’ (body of land vs. short cloak). The
philosophical and the folk concept of identity are intimately related. Recall, in this
respect, that the folk notion of identity satisfies a close cousin of Leibniz’s Law.
Also recall that the folk relation of identity is, like the philosophical one, both
reflexive and symmetric. And while folk identity is not transitive, ordinary identity
judgments may still typically be supposed to be transitive. Paradoxical cases in
which transitivity breaks down appear to be abnormal in the straightforward
statistical sense that they are rarely, if ever, considered in daily life. (When, outside
the philosophy classroom, did you ever even contemplate whether or not a ship with
a number of planks replaced was identical to the original ship?) And still in the same
connection, we note that it will obviously hold that if a and b are identical in the
philosophical sense—they are one and the same object—then, for every context C, a
is identicalC to b; supposing a rich enough arsenal of similarity spaces, we may also
have that if, for every context C, a is identicalC to b, then a and b are one and the
same object.26
What is more, in every context C, a judgment to the effect that two things are
identicalC may plausibly be assumed to ‘‘feel’’ like a judgment as to their identity in
the philosophers’ sense. After all, it is easily conceivable that people mistake the
restricted quantifier ‘‘for all contextually relevant respects,’’ which is part of the
meaning of the identity predicate on the folk interpretation, for an unrestricted one,
given that in each context they are attending solely to respects relevant in that
context; that is, the restriction may easily go unnoticed precisely because the
respects outside the domain of quantification are ones that are being ignored in the
given context. Much the same applies to the possible differences in relevant respects
between things that are identicalC in C: These differences are negligible in that
context, so, in that context at least, we neglect them.
We believe that, in view of these facts, it should be unsurprising that even in
philosophical discussions the folk notion of identity, which on our analysis occupies
26 The latter claim seems unproblematic for ordinary objects. For elementary particles, it may be more
controversial; see Muller and Saunders (2008) and van Fraassen and Peschard (2008) for recent
discussion.
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center stage in the paradoxes of identity, is easily conflated with the traditional
philosophical notion, which we believe not to be jeopardized by these paradoxes.
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